Kamsi Amaechi is a penultimate-year LL.B. candidate at Afe Babalola University, where she maintains a First Class standing. As a published researcher, her scholarship examines critical topics including AI regulation, sovereign debt, and tax policy reform. Kamsi has gained extensive practical experience through internships at various Nigerian law firms, where she has drafted pleadings, settlement agreements, and retainership letters, and has contributed to academic research at the OGEES Institute. Her professional focus lies at the intersection of law, technology, and economic policy, further bolstered by specialized training in AI and blockchain legal frameworks.
Big Tech refers to the specific firms Alphabet (Google), Meta (Facebook), Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft, as these firms have platforms that depend on massive data collection, extensive market reach, and a large customer base while offering free or low-cost services to consumers. [i]“Big Tech” shapes the information economy in ways that outpace the ability of federal courts and antitrust enforcement agencies to respond. The rapid rise of generative artificial intelligence (“AI”) amplifies these dynamics by creating new forms of market power and anticompetitive risks, particularly price-fixing. This article examines how Big Tech’s use of AI systems interacts with existing antitrust doctrine.[ii] Section 2 of the Sherman Act and related statutes.[iii] These proceedings reflect a shift from traditional “consumer welfare” standards focused primarily on price effects toward broader concerns about market structure, innovation, data control, and barriers to entry issues with profound implications for businesses, consumers, and the digital economy.
At the beginning of 2026, several questions remain: Will pending cases challenging big tech’s monopolies result in market restructuring, or will courts continue to impose limited behavioural constraints? Will enforcement activity relate to algorithmic pricing lead to meaningful changes or dead ends?[iv]
Monopolization cases and 2025 highlights[v]
- Judge Amit P. Mehta imposed behavioural remedies in September, banning exclusive distribution contracts and requiring limited search data sharing, among other stipulations. The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) request to force divestiture of Chrome and other structural remedies was rejected, with the court citing potential competition from generative AI companies like OpenAI. The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) long-running case against Google stands out as one of the most significant antitrust victories in decades. In 2024, a federal court ruled that Google maintained an illegal monopoly in general search through exclusive distribution agreements (e.g., paying billions to Apple for default status). The remedies phase, finalized around April 2026, imposed behavioral restrictions rather than a full structural breakup:[vi]
A multi-year ban on exclusive default contracts for Google Search, Chrome, Google Assistant, and related apps.
Mandatory sharing of certain search index and user-interaction data with qualified rivals on commercially reasonable terms.
Requirements to offer search and text ad syndication services to competitors.
Oversight by a technical committee.
· Google Adtech: Judge Leonie M. Brinkema found Google monopolized publisher ad servers and ad exchanges in April. The remedies trial concluded in November 2025, with a decision pending in early 2026. The remedies decision in early 2026 will test whether courts will order structural separation despite their reluctance in the search case. The DOJ has requested divestiture of Google’s AdX exchange; a ruling requiring breakup would mark the first forced divestiture of a major tech platform.[vii]
· Meta: Judge James E. Boasberg rejected the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) monopolization case in November, concluding that Meta lacks monopoly power when TikTok and YouTube are included in the social networking market. . The FTC appealed the decision to dismiss the case in January.[viii]
- Apple (DOJ): The DOJ sued Apple in March 2024 for monopolizing smartphone markets. Apple’s motion to dismiss was denied in June 2025, allowing the case to proceed toward trial.
- Apple (Epic): The Ninth Circuit affirmed in December that Apple committed civil contempt by wilfully violating court orders, imposing a 27% commission on external purchases and restricting alternative payment options despite previous injunctions.
· California reform: California’s Law Revision Commission released its Tentative Recommendation on single-firm conduct, proposing an expansion of state antitrust law beyond federal standards. The comment period closes in early 2026. If adopted in 2026, California’s antitrust reform would create divergent legal standards between California and federal law, potentially emboldening other states to pursue similar reforms.
- Amazon: The FTC v. Amazon[ix]trial is scheduled for late 2026, targeting Amazon’s alleged monopoly in online superstores and marketplace services.
Key Legal and Commercial Implications
- For Big Tech and Digital Markets: Companies must reassess distribution deals, data practices, and acquisitions. Behavioural remedies like data-sharing could foster competition but raise privacy, security, and intellectual property concerns. Appeals are likely, and enforcement may vary with administration priorities, though continuity in pursuing existing cases has been observed.
- For Smaller Businesses and Startups: Reduced barriers could open opportunities in search, e-commerce, and ad tech. However, uncertainty during litigation may chill investment or innovation. Antitrust scrutiny of AI-driven tools (eg, algorithmic pricing) is also rising, as seen in cases like US v RealPage.[x]
- Broader Commercial and Civil Law Ramifications: These cases influence merger review, contract enforceability (eg, exclusivity clauses), and platform liability. They intersect with privacy, consumer protection, and even constitutional issues around free speech and regulation of intermediaries. States are playing an active role, sometimes diverging from federal approaches, creating a patchwork compliance environment.[xi]
- Global Context: US developments parallel EU actions (eg, Digital Markets Act) and other jurisdictions, affecting multinational operations and digital sovereignty debates.[xii]
Looking Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities
Antitrust in 2026 grapples with AI’s transformative impact. Generative AI blurs lines between search, social, and commerce, potentially disrupting traditional monopoly definitions. Courts have shown reluctance for drastic structural changes in dynamic markets, favouring targeted injunctions and monitoring.
For businesses, proactive compliance reviewing contracts, assessing market power, and monitoring enforcement signals is essential. Policymakers and courts must balance promoting competition with avoiding over-regulation that stifles the very innovation driving economic growth.
This wave of enforcement signals a maturing recognition that digital markets require vigilant oversight, even as technology evolves faster than doctrine. Whether these cases ultimately deliver more competitive, innovative markets or prove cumbersome to administer will shape commercial law for years to come. Legal practitioners and executives alike should stay attuned to appeals, remedies implementation, and parallel private litigation.
[i] Yusuf Arifin and Ashley Zhou ‘The Algorithmic Age of Antitrust: Rethinking the Consumer Welfare Standard for Big Tech’ (2026) CULR <https://www.culawreview.org/journal/the-algorithmic-age-of-antitrust-rethinking-the-consumer-welfare-standard-for-big-tech>accessed 7 July 2026.
[ii] ibid.
[iii]Sherman Antitrust Act 1890, s 2.
[iv] Tech Policy Press, ‘Looking Ahead on US Antitrust Enforcement and Tech: Will 2026 Deliver More of the Same?’ (29 January 2026) accessed 7 July 2026.
[v]ibid.
[vi] United States Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, ‘Department of Justice Wins Significant Remedies Against Google’ (Press Release No 25-902, 2 September 2025) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-wins-significant-remedies-against-google> accessed 9 July 2026.
[vii] ibid.
[viii]ibid.
[ix] Federal Trade Commission v Amazon.com, Inc 2:23-cv-01495 (W.D. Wash, filed 26 September 2023).
Bibliography:
[x] Tech Policy Press, ‘Looking Ahead on US Antitrust Enforcement and Tech: 8Will 2026 Deliver More of the Same?’ (29 January 2026) accessed 7 July 2026.
[xi] Yusuf Arifin and Ashley Zhou ‘The Algorithmic Age of Antitrust: Rethinking the Consumer Welfare Standard for Big Tech’ (2026) CULR <https://www.culawreview.org/journal/the-algorithmic-age-of-antitrust-rethinking-the-consumer-welfare-standard-for-big-tech>accessed 7 July 2026.
[xii] William E Kovacic and others, ‘2026 Antitrust Year in Preview: Big Tech’ (Wilson Sonsini, 22 January 2026) accessed 7 July 2026.
