Deferred Prosecution Agreements And White-collar Crime: A Case For India

White- collar crimes remain a challenge to the economic integrity of India, and the traditional adversarial system of criminal justice has failed to provide effective and deterrent responses. The research problem identified in this paper is whether the criminal justice system in India can assimilate Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPAs) as an alternative enforcement procedure for corporate offences. The primary research question is- Can DPAs be constitutionally and procedurally assimilated into the Indian legal system to combat whitecollar crime, and what measures the Indian legal system to combat white- collar crime, and what measures can be taken to ensure fairness and accountability? Employing a doctrinal and comparative methodology, this paper examines the constitutional validity of DPAs in the Indian Constitution under Articles 14 and 21, the case of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha, 2023, and special laws like Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002. A comparative study of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Singapore reveals opposite trends: the U.S. model reveals the dangers of unchecked prosecutorial discretion, while the U.K. and Singapore models highlight the need for judicial review. The salient result is that DPAs are not constitutionally banned in India, as long as the prosecutorial discretion is exercised in a transparent manner within a legislatively defined framework. The paper contends that a carefully crafted DPA regime, which includes legislatively defined eligibility criteria, judicial approval, public disclosure, and independent monitoring of compliance, can increase the efficiency of prosecution, overcome delays in the system, and make corporations more accountable.